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I. INTRODUCTION
Maine Rule of Evidence 4071 allows the injured party in a tort
action to present evidence that the defendant took remedial mea-
sures after the injury, as evidence of the defendant's negligence.
Federal Rule of Evidence 407,2 on the other hand, excludes such
evidence on the theory that admitting the evidence would discour-
age subsequent repairs. The Maine Rule and the Federal Rule col-
lided in Rioux v. Daniel International Corp.'
In Rioux the United States District Court for Maine applied
the federal rule, deciding the case based on a time-honored but
simplistic approach. The court relied on Hanna v. Plumer4 for the
proposition that a rule which the United States Congress enacts is
constitutional as long as the rule is procedural.5 Under this consti-
tutional standard, all the Federal Rules of Evidence are "unques-
tionably valid" 6 because the test of whether a rule is rationally ca-
pable of classification as procedure has a low threshold. Thus, the
conflict in Rioux posed little trouble for the court: it applied Fed-
eral Rule 407 because it is constitutional and brushed aside the
state rule.
7
The Rioux court's approach is unsatisfactory. Undoubtedly,
Congress has the constitutional power to enact rules of procedure
that alter state substantive rights. As Professor Wellborn has
noted, however, "[t]hat the power exists does not justify the as-
sumption that it has been exercised."8 The Rioux court never ex-
amined Rule 407 to determine whether it is even "arguably" proce-
dural. This examination would have revealed that Rule 407 is
based primarily on the social policy of encouraging repairs and,
therefore, is more arguably substantive than procedural.9 The
1. The Maine Rule appears in relevant part infra note 201.
2. The Federal Rule appears in full infra note 183.
3. 582 F. Supp. 620 (D. Me. 1984).
4. 380 U.S. 460 (1975).
5. 582 F. Supp. at 625; see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (setting out the
standard for an act of Congress); Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. REV. 693,
698, 706, 740 (1974); Wellborn, The Federal Rules of Evidence and the Application of State
Law in the Federal Court, 55 Tsx L. REV. 371, 398, 400 (1977).
6. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 398.
7. Rioux, 582 F. Supp. at 625.
8. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 401.
9. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir.
1984); D. LOUISELL & C. MELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 235 (1978 & Supp. 1984); 2 J. WEIN-
STEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 407(01), at 7 (1982).
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court should have made this inquiry for several reasons. Both Con-
gress and the federal courts have indicated a sensitivity to state
substantive law in conflicts with federal rules. The Rules of Deci-
sion Act (RDA)'0 and the Rules Enabling Act (REA)"I also indi-
cate a concern for protecting state substantive law. Furthermore,
former Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a) reflects an attitude of
deference to state policy. Finally, Congress altered the proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence to protect state substantive law.
12
In light of this deferential attitude, Congress arguably did not
focus on the possibility that Rule 407 would conflict with a state
rule. 3 That Congress failed to require reference to state evidence
law in Rule 407 is probably a result of the belief that the exclu-
sionary principle of Rule 407 was a universal common-law princi-
ple. 14 In 1975, when Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, the exclusionary principle was traditional.'" The Maine
Rules of Evidence did not become effective until 1976,16 and Maine
is the only state that admits evidence of subsequent repairs as cir-
cumstantial evidence of negligence. 17 Congress, therefore, could not
have foreseen any conflict between Rule 407 and state substantive
law."8
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982). The Act is provided infra text accompanying note 19.
11. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). The Act is provided in part infra note 58.
12. See Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on
Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., ser.1, at 171-73 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]; H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 8-9 (1973); Wellborn, supra note 5, at 401.
13. See D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, at 264-66.
14. Id.
15. Id.; see Note, The Repair Rule: Maine Rule of Evidence 407(a) and the Admissi-
bility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Proving Negligence, 27 ME. L. REV. 225, 235
(1975).
16. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine promulgated the state rules on May 13,
1975, and they became effective on February 2, 1976. Field, Maine Rules of Evidence: What
They Are and How They Got That Way, 27 Ma. L. REV. 203, 203 n.1 (1975).
17. See Note, supra note 15, at 235.
A few state rules do not bar evidence of subsequent measures when offered as proof in a
products liability action. See ALASKA R. EVID. 407; HAWAII R. EVID. 407; IOWA R EVID. 407;
TEx. R. EviD. 407. On the other hand, some state rules explicitly provide that the exclusion-
ary rule applies to products liability actions. See ARiz. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 12-686 (1981); NEB.
Ra.V STAT. § 27-407 (1979). Another federal-state conflict is likely in this situation. Circuit
courts in those circuits in which states admit the evidence in products liability actions have
not yet decided whether the federal rule preempts the state rule. See D. LoUsELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 9, at 243 (Supp. 1984).
18. Congress also did not foresee the federal-state conflict in products liability actions.
The state rules allowing evidence in products liability actions also were enacted after the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See D. LouisELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, at 221-23 (Supp.
1984).
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This Note advocates that when a Federal Rule of Evidence
conflicts with a state rule, a court should examine closely the pur-
pose of the rules in an effort to balance the competing policies of
comity and procedural uniformity. Part II of this Note provides a
general background on legislative and court decisions concerning
federal-state conflicts. Part II also illustrates the congressional and
judicial inclination to protect state substantive law. Part III dis-
cusses the conflict between the Maine Rule and Federal Rule 407.
Part IV suggests an approach to the general conflict between state
and federal rules and applies that approach to Rule 407.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The legal background necessary to any discussion of a conflict
between a federal and state rule of evidence encompasses a much-
debated combination of issues of federalism and federal separation
of powers. Although the courts' approach to this conflict is simple,
this Note contends that that approach is incomplete. To lay the
groundwork for this proposition, the following background dis-
cusses the doctrines of federalism and separation of powers as they
have arisen under the RDA, the REA, which Congress used to pro-
mulgate the Federal Rules of Evidence, former Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 43(a), the predecessor of the modern rules of evi-
dence, and the congressional and scholarly debate surrounding the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
A. The Rules of Decision Act
Congress enacted the RDA in 1789 as section 34 of the Federal
Judiciary Act. The RDA provides: "The laws of the several states
...shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States . . . ,, 9 Probably the most difficult
and important issue facing courts trying to apply the broad lan-
guage of the RDA is the meaning of the words, "[t]he laws of the
several states." In the nearly two hundred years of the RDA's exis-
tence, a handful of relatively recent decisions give these words
their current meaning.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1982).
588 [Vol. 38:585
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1. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,20 one of the modern founda-
tions of federalism,21 is the primary decision that construes the
RDA. Erie overruled the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,22 which had
held, among other things, that the word "laws" in the RDA re-
ferred only to state legislative enactments, and that the federal
courts were not bound to follow state court decisions. 23 The Erie
Court disapproved of Swift because it "introduced grave discrimi-
nation by noncitizens against citizens '2 4 by making legal rights
vary according to whether the action was in state or federal court.
Because the noncitizen had the privilege of selecting the court, the
doctrine "rendered impossible equal protection of the law."25 The
Erie Court primarily disapproved of the practice of "forum shop-
ping" that had arisen in response to the Swift doctrine.26 The Erie
court concluded that to end discrimination and forum shopping,
"[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by
acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the
state.
'27
Although the Erie decision is the landmark case on federal-
state conflicts, it provides little guidance on actual RDA issues.2 s
The Court did not suggest a limit to the application of state law in
20. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
21. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
22. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
23. Id. at 19.
24. Erie, 304 U.S. at 74. For a discussion of the meaning of the "grave discrimination"
that Swift introduced, see Ely, supra note 5, at 712 n.111. Commentators have criticized the
reference in Erie to "discrimination by non-citizens against citizens," 304 U.S. at 74, be-
cause citizen plaintiffs also have access to the federal courts. P. BATOR, P. MISHIN, D. SHA-
PIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
707 (2d ed. 1973). The Erie Court, however, was referring to the asymmetry that arises when
a nonresident sues a resident. A resident defendant has no right to removal, see 28 U.S.C. §
1441 (1982), and thus must abide by the nonresident plaintiff's choice of forum. See Ely,
supra note 5, at 712 n.111. Professor Ely discusses an additional meaning of the Erie dis-
crimination. He refers to the unfairness of subjecting a person involved in litigation with a
citizen of a different state to a body of law that is different from the body of law that
applies when his next-door neighbor has a similar litigation with a cocitizen. Id.
25. 304 U.S. at 75.
26. Id. at 73-74; see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965) (first using the term
"forum shopping"). Erie cited the decision in Black & White Taxicab Co. v. Brown & Yel-
low Taxicab Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1927), in which a Kentucky corporation reincorporated in
Tennessee to sue in federal court under Tennessee law. The Erie Court frowned upon the
practice of picking a court by its law. Erie, 304 U.S. at 73-74, 76-77.
27. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.




the face of a conflicting federal law.2 9 Courts and commentators,
however, have assumed that substance and procedure were the
critical concepts.30 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure substi-
tuted national uniformity for state conformity in federal procedure
the same year that Erie required adherence to state law in ques-
tions of substantive law. This concurrent, diverse treatment repre-
sents the Court's recognition of a dichotomy between substance
and procedure. 1 The broad command of Erie, therefore, is that
federal courts should apply state substantive law and federal pro-
cedural law.3 2 Because the Erie decision is so ambiguous, however,
concern arose among jurists and scholars that the Court might de-
stroy procedural uniformity by failing to adhere to the presumed
substance-procedure dichotomy." After Erie, therefore, the test
that courts should apply to a conflict under the RDA remained
uncertain.
2. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York
The first significant judicial attempt to formulate a test for
the RDA came in 1945, in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York.34 Justice
Frankfurter discarded the labels "substance" and "procedure" in
the context of the RDA. Instead, he established an "outcome de-
termination" test, reasoning that the essence of Erie was that in a
diversity suit the outcome of the litigation in federal court should
be substantially the same as the outcome in state court.3 5 Justice
Frankfurter stated that courts should follow state law on any issue
with "consequences that . . . intimately affect recovery or non-re-
covery."'3 6 This test flows logically from Erie because if the federal
rule would alter the outcome significantly, the rule would lead to
forum shopping and discrimination.
29. See Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal Rules, 3
VAND. L. REv. 711 (1950) (discussing the Erie rule as invading the federal rules and causing
uncertainty and confusion).
30. See Ely, supra note 5, at 708.
31. Merrigan, supra note 29, at 711. An example of a substantive law would be an
implied warranty of merchantability. See U.C.C. § 2-314 (1978). An example of a procedural
rule is a rule requiring that the parties put their names on their pleadings. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 10.
32. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
33. Merrigan, supra note 29, at 716.
34. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
35. Id. at 109.
36. Id. at 110.
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3. Ragan, Woods, and Cohen
Although the York outcome determination test endured for
some time, it soon seemed overly broad because it threatened to
erode the authority of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.3 7 In
Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co." the Court held
that it could not apply Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure39 in a diversity case arising out of a state cause of action. The
state statute of limitations would have barred the suit in state
court, but under the federal rule the statute of limitations would
not have run. The Court applied the state rule to be consistent
with Erie and York, 4 0 reasoning that because local law provided
the cause of action, qualifications or abridgements of the action
were possible only under local law.4 1 The Court believed that a
contrary holding would create a "different measure of the cause of
action in one court than in the other, and the principle of Erie
[would be] transgressed.
42
In Woods v. Interstate Realty Co. 43 the Court assumed that
no federal rule was relevant to the case and, instead, applied a
state statute providing that corporations which had not qualified
to do business in the state could not sue in its courts." Although
the Court did not mention Federal Rule 17(b),45 that rule ad-
dresses this issue and dictates that the Court should apply the rule
of the incorporating state. Citing York and Erie, the Court held
37. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Woods v. Interstate Realty Co.,
337 U.S. 535 (1949); see also Ely, supra note 5, at 709 (pushed to an extreme, the York test
implies that a litigant in a diversity action could insist on filing pleadings under state time-
table because the federal timetable would cause him to lose); Merrigan, supra note 29, at
718-23 (describing inconsistency that resulted from the application of the York test). Hanna
addressed these fears by elevating the federal rules to a constitutional status and refining
the RDA test. See infra text accompanying notes 80-82.
38. 337 U.S. 530 (1949).
39. Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: "A civil action is commenced
by filing a complaint with the court." FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
40. 337 U.S. at 532. Kansas had a two-year statute of limitations that would toll only
by the service of a summons. The federal rule would toll the statute upon the filing of a
complaint. Two years ran between the filing of the complaint and the service of the sum-
mons. Id. at 531.
41. Id. at 533.
42. Id.
43. 337 U.S. 535 (1949).
44. Id. at 536.
45. Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in part: "The capacity of
a corporation to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law under which it was organ-
ized." FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
that to discourage the discrimination that Erie was designed to
eliminate, the state rule must apply.
46
In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.47 the Court ap-
plied a state statute that required the plaintiff to post a bond se-
curing payment of defense costs as a prerequisite to bringing suit.48
Federal Rule 23 also provides prerequisites for bringing an action,
but the Court concluded that no conflict existed between the state
statute and Rule 23.49 Citing the RDA, Erie, and York, the Court
further reasoned that the only substantial argument that the plain-
tiff below could raise against applying the state statute would be
that its provisions were "mere rules of procedure rather than rules
of substantive law."' 50 The Court held that the statute in question
was not merely a regulation of procedure because it created a "new
liability where none existed before.
''51
Ragan, Woods, and Cohen led to confusion and fear in many
jurists and scholars. In each case, Justice Rutledge dissented from
the Court's extension of the Erie doctrine and stated that judges
could not escape making the decision between substance and pro-
cedure, even though it could become "well-nigh impossible." 52
Commentators feared that the Erie doctrine, as extended, would
erode the federal rules and destroy the hope of a uniform federal
procedure.5 Today, the Court and commentators recognize that
the main problem with Ragan, Woods, and Cohen is that the
Court decided them under the wrong statutory test. When the fed-
eral rule of decision at issue is wholly judge-made, the RDA is the
standard by which to determine whether state or federal law ap-
plies.5 4 On the other hand, when the federal rule at issue is a Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure or another rule promulgated pursuant
to the Rules Enabling Act (REA), as in Ragan, Woods, and Cohen,
46. 337 U.S. at 538.
47. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
48. Id. at 556.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 555.
51. Id. The Court concluded: "We do not think a statute which so conditions the
stockholder's action can be disregarded by the federal court as a mere procedural device."
Id. at 556.
52. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 559 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
53. Merrigan, supra note 29, at 711, 717, 719; see also Clark, The Tompkins Case and
the Federal Rules, 1 F.R.D. 417, 419 (1940) (advocating following federal procedures unless
state public policy unequivocally demanded an opposite result).
54. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1965); Ely, supra note 5, at 698; Well-
born, supra note 5, at 399.
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the REA and cases construing it provide the relevant standard. 55
Not until 1965 did the Supreme Court set out the proper guide-
lines for distinguishing between the statutory tests."'
Although the Supreme Court decided Ragan, Woods, and Co-
hen under the wrong standard, they accurately reflect the policies
of the RDA, particularly its sensitivity to state substantive law.
Erie and its progeny addressed the twin evils of forum shopping
and discrimination by noncitizens against citizens. To cure these
evils, the Court applied state law whenever the answer to the legal
question at issue would determine the outcome of the litigation.
B. The Rules Enabling Act
In 1934 Congress enacted the REA57 to give the Supreme
Court the power to prescribe the general rules of practice and pro-
cedure in the federal courts.5 8 Congress also provided that these
rules could not change a substantive right. The first sentence of
the Act embodies a checklist approach to determining whether a
rule is authorized by the Act. The first sentence imposes the same
limitation on the scope of rules that the Hanna Court set out in its
discussion of the constitutional standard for Acts of Congress re-
lating to the federal courts: "[T]he constitutional provision for a
federal court system . . . includes a power to regulate matters
which . ..are rationally capable of classification as either [sub-
stance or procedure]."5' 9 The second sentence of the REA, however,
imposes a limitation that appears to create an area of exclusive
55. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471; Ely, supra note 5, at 698; Wellborn, supra note 5, at
398.
56. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470-71. The Court held that the Erie line of cases applied
if a conflict existed between judge-made federal law and a state law. See infra notes 75-89
and accompanying text (discussing Hanna). Hanna did not overrule Woods because the
Woods Court had assumed that no federal rule covered the point in question and, therefore,
no conflict existed. The Hanna Court distinguished Ragan and Cohen by characterizing
them as cases in which the Court construed the Federal Rule narrowly to avoid a clash with
state law. 380 U.S. at 470 n.12; see Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749-52 (1980)
(holding that Hanna did not overrule Ragan because the federal and state rule did not
collide).
57. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
58. The REA states in relevant part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms
of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district
courts and courts of appeal of the United States in civil actions ....
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. ...
Id.
59. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472; see Ely, supra note 5, at 718.
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state authority.60 Although the decisions construing the Act reflect
a deference to state substantive law, they do not consider expressly
the second sentence.
6 1
1. Supreme Court Decisions
In Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.,62 the landmark REA case,6 3 the
Court construed the Act merely as a checklist of areas subject to
the Act and ignored the second sentence. 4 When the plaintiff in
Sibbach refused to submit to a mental examination under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 35,65 the lower court imposed sanctions for
contempt of court. The plaintiff contended that Congress had in-
tended the REA to prevent federal courts from dealing with sub-
stantive rights.66 The Court responded that "[t]he [REA] test must
be whether a rule really regulates procedures,-the judicial process
for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and
for justly administering remedy and redress for [their] disregard or
infraction .... -67 The plaintiff admitted that the rule was proce-
dural, but contended that the second sentence of the REA imposed
a separate limit on rules with substantive effects. The Court, how-
ever, was unwilling to go beyond the first sentence and held that
the rule was valid under the REA because it was procedural. The
Court could not accept that a rule may be procedural and at the
same time abridge substantive rights.68 By only asking whether the
rule regulated procedure, the Court collapsed the REA's two ques-
tions into one.6 9 Courts7 0 and commentators7' have cited the Sib-
60. Ely, supra note 5, at 719. The second sentence is not necessarily limited to pre-
serving state law, but also must apply to federal substantive rights. The sentence reveals, at
least in part, a concern for state law.
61. But see Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107, 111-12 (5th Cir. 1956) (giving effect to the
limitation of the second sentence); infra text accompanying notes 90-99 (discussing Perry).
62. 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
63. Ely, supra note 5, at 719.
64. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 14; Ely, supra note 5, at 719.
65. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states in part: "[When] the mental
or physical condition of a party is in controversy, the court. . . may order [the party] to
submit to a physical or mental examination. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 35.
66. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 13.
67. Id. at 14.
68. Ely, supra note 5, at 719.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 465; Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 113
(1964); Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445-46 (1946).
71. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 155 (statement of former Supreme Court Justice
Arthur J. Goldberg); Korn, Continuing Effect of State Rules of Evidence in the Federal
Courts, 48 F.R.D. 65, 76 (1969).
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bach construction as the proper test of a rule's validity under the
REA.
Even though the Sibbach Court collapsed the two sentences, it
nonetheless recognized the substantive-procedural dichotomy in-
herent in the REA. The Court implied that the purpose of the di-
chotomy was to protect federalism.7 2 According to the Court, the
first sentence delegates to the Court Congress' power to regulate
procedure, but draws the line at substantive law because Congress
never has established state substantive law or abolished a state
substantive right.7 3 The Court then referred to the RDA, which re-
quires application of the state rule when the federal rule has
crossed the line from procedure to substance.74 The Court held
that it reached the limits of its authority under the REA at the
point where state law became applicable under the RDA. Although
the Court muddied the tests, it recognized the importance of pro-
tecting state substantive law against federal intrusion.
In Hanna v. Plumere5 the Court clarified many aspects of the
federal-state conflict, but did not provide a lucid, structural analy-
sis of the REA. The litigation concerned the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and a conflicting state statute on service of a summons.
The Court merely reiterated Sibbach's "really regulates procedure"
test 6 and, in a footnote, illustrated that the rule in question was
procedural.77 The Hanna Court, however, did provide a useful
analysis of the appropriate standard for determining whether a
federal rule should preempt state law. The Court distinguished the
circumstances in which the REA standard applies from situations
in which the RDA standard applies.7 18 The Court held that the fed-
eral rules are subject to the terms of the REA and constitutional
restrictions, reasoning that neither Congress nor the federal courts
can fashion rules that the United States Constitution does not au-
thorize.79 The Court further held that the test of the constitution-
ality of a rule is whether the rule is "rationally capable of classifi-
72. See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 10; see also Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934,
130 U. PA. L. R.v. 1015, 1108 & n.430 (1982) (discussing Sibbach).
73. Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9-10.
74. Id. at 10.
75. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
76. Id. at 464.
77. Id. at 462 n.1.
78. Id. at 471.
79. Id. at 471-72. The Court held that the RDA test applied to conflicts between fed-
eral judge-made law and state law. Id. at 470-71.
1985]
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cation as .either" procedural or substantive.8 0 The Hanna Court
did not indicate whether it intended to create a constitutional test
separate from the REA restrictions or within the REA itself. Com-
mentators, however, generally agree that the first sentence of the
REA embodies the constitutional test because the sentence tracks
the Hanna Court's statement of the requirements of the Constitu-
tion."' Apparently, the Court felt that Congress included the first
sentence of the REA to provide the Court with rulemaking power
and to indicate that Congress did not want to give the Court any
more power than Congress itself has.2 The Hanna Court, there-
fore, interpreted "procedure" broadly and, like Sibbach, ignored
the possibility that a procedural rule can also affect substantive
rights. Because the Court has not given any consideration to the
second sentence of the REA, the Court has made the REA test of
whether a federal rule is valid equivalent to the constitutional test
of Congress' power to promulgate rules.83
Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Hanna, provided
more guidance about the significance of substantive state law in
the REA context. Justice Harlan would have inquired whether
"the choice of rule would substantially affect those primary deci-
sions respecting human conduct which our constitutional system
leaves to state regulation." ' If so, Justice Harlan believed that
Erie and the Constitution would require that the state rule prevail
over a conflicting federal rule.8 5 According to Justice Harlan, the
Court had eroded a basic principle of federalism by its "arguably
procedural ergo constitutional" test.86 Although Justice Harlan's
80. Id. at 471.
81. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 5, at 718, 723; Wellborn, supra note 5, at 398-99. The
first sentence imposes the same limitation as article M and the "necessary and proper"
clause of the Constitution. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472; see U.S. CONST. art. M & art. I, § 8. The
Framers intended the reference to diversity jurisdiction in article III, U.S. CONsT. art. III, §
2, augmented by the "necessary and proper" clause and the article I power to establish
lower federal courts, as a grant of power to provide courts for diversity cases and to pre-
scribe the rules of practice and procedure by which the courts could hear cases. See Ely,
supra note 5, at 704.
82. See Weinstein, The Uniformity-Conformity Dilemma Facing Draftsmen pf Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 356 (1969) (contending that if the Supreme
Court adopts a rule and Congress does not veto the rule under the REA, courts may rely
upon the rule to show what Congress authorized and what it could authorize).
83. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
84. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring).
85. Id. (Harlan, J., concurring); see H. HART & . WEcHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 678 (1st ed. 1953) (Harlan refers to this test in his opinion.).
86. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475-76 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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belief that Erie was controllings7 would confuse the relevant statu-
tory standard, his emphasis on federalism suggests that the REA is
also concerned with state powers. Justice Harlan never rejected the
majority's reliance on the REA; he only repudiated the majority's
application of the "arguably procedural" test to the federal rules
because it ignored what he believed was the main issue in a fed-
eral-state conflict-federalism.8
The Hanna majority, despite its broad interpretation of the
term "procedural" and its emphasis on the first sentence of the
REA, expressed concern about federalism as well. The Court found
that the "broad command of Erie" was identical to the command
of the REA: federal courts must apply state substantive law and
federal procedural law.89 Although the Hanna Court recognized
that the problems were different under each standard and applied
a constitutional test under the REA, the Court recognized that
both standards seek to protect federalism. Thus, although the
Hanna Court did not recognize that a procedural rule also may be
substantive, the Court nonetheless emphasized federalism concerns
in the context of the REA.
2. The Fifth Circuit
Although the Supreme Court has not given much considera-
tion to the second sentence of the REA, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has given effect to the limitation that
the sentence imposes. In Perry v. Allen 0 the plaintiff sued the In-
ternal Revenue Service for recovery of taxes. The plaintiff died
during the litigation and the case focused on Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 25(a)(1), which provides that if a litigant does not bring
a motion for substitution of a deceased party within two years af-
ter the death, the court must dismiss the action.9 1 The plaintiff's
successors argued that the rule impermissibly infringed upon the
plaintiff's federal substantive right to sue. The court noted that
when the Supreme Court enacted Rule 25(a)(1) a federal statute of
limitations existed, and the Supreme Court intended Rule 25(a)(1)
merely to provide the means for enforcing the statute of limita-
87. Id. at 474 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan felt that the Erie doctrine alone
should control all choices between state and federal law in diversity cases. See Ely, supra
note 5, at 699.
88. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475-77 (Harlan, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 465.
90. 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956).
91. FED. R. Civ. P. 25(a).
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tions 2 The statute provided the substance and the rule provided
the procedure. The court further noted that Congress repealed the
statute in 1948, several years before the Perry case commenced.
9 3
The court, therefore, had to evaluate the effect and the validity of
the federal rule standing alone. 4
The court held Rule 25(a)(1) invalid, reasoning that the REA
required that a rule be procedural and that it not affect substan-
tive rights. 5 The court found that the REA authorized rules that
"provide the machinery for the administration of justice, the
modes of proceeding by which legal rights are enforced; and do not
purport to deal with the law which gives or defines such rights...
or the existence or boundaries of the remedies" for those rights.96
Thus, the court held that Rule 25(a)(1) was invalid because it at-
tempted to abridge the plaintiff's right to bring an action to trial
on the merits. 7 The court stated that "[s]uch an attempt is
outside the mandate and inside the caveat of the Act of Con-
gress." 98 The court concluded that for the substantive law of limi-
tations on the right of substitution, the court must look to the
"general law," federal or state.99
The Fifth Circuit, therefore, has given effect to the Act's sec-
ond sentence. The Perry court recognized that although the Su-
preme Court designed Rule 25(a)(1) to be procedural, it abridged
substantive rights. While Perry arguably implied that the lack of a
federal statute of limitations caused the rule to cease to be proce-
dural, the Fifth Circuit's concern that the rule fell outside the
mandate of the REA because it affected substantive rights suggests
that the court recognized the REA contemplates that a rule can be
procedural yet also affect substantive rights. The Perry opinion ar-
guably meets Professor Ely's criticism that the Sibbach Court was
unwilling to accept the possibility of a situation that the drafters
of the Act addressed in the second sentence.100 The Supreme
Court, nevertheless, has not gone beyond Sibbach and Hanna in
its analysis of the second sentence. Scholarly opinion in the area
may help flesh out the meaning of the REA and the broad lan-
92. 239 F.2d at 110.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 110-11.
95. Id. at 111-12.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 112.
98. Id.
99. Id. The court then looked to federal law because the subject matter was federal.
100. Ely, supra note 5, at 719.
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guage of the opinions that have interpreted the Act.
3. Commentators
Professors Ely and Burbank disagree in their interpretations
of the Rules Enabling Act,10 1 but a comparison of their approaches
will help focus the state-federal conflict. Professor Ely believes
that the substantive-procedural dichotomy reflects a federalism
concern. Professor Burbank proposes that the dichotomy reflects a
federal allocation of powers concern.
Professor Ely approaches conflicts between federal and state
rules of civil procedure under the REA with two constructs: (1) the
federal checklist approach, which provides that the Constitution
lists the powers of the federal government; and (2) an enclave con-
struct, which recognizes an enclave of exclusive state authority.102
According to Professor Ely, the first sentence of the Act embodies
the federal checklist approach and the second sentence contains
the enclave analysis.10 3 He defines a procedural rule as a rule
designed to make the process of litigation a fair and efficient mech-
anism for the resolution of disputes,0 while a substantive rule is a
right granted for one or more nonprocedural reasons.10 5 Professor
Ely then proposes a two-step analysis. The first step is to deter-
mine whether the rule is procedural and thus satisfies the first sen-
tence of the REA. The second step is to determine whether apply-
ing the rule would abridge any substantive rights under a
conflicting state statute in violation of the second sentence of the
REA. 06
101. See Burbank, supra note 72; Ely, supra note 5.
102. Ely, supra note 5, at 701-02.
Generally, Professor Ely rejects the idea that the Constitution embodies an enclave of
state power, believing instead that whatever is not on the federal checklist belongs to the
states, as the tenth amendment provides. Id. at 701-02. For the REA, however, he resurrects
the enclave analysis, in light of the second sentence. Id. at 719.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 724.
105. Id. at 725. Professor Ely suggests that a rule could be both procedural and sub-
stantive. For example, he explains that states enact statutes of limitations for the substan-
tive purpose of relieving people's minds and for the procedural purpose of keeping down the
size of court dockets and avoiding stale, untrustworthy evidence. According to Professor Ely,
a rule that is procedural and substantive would pass the first sentence of the REA but fall
under the second sentence. Id. at 726-27.
106. Id. Aiming to resurrect the second sentence of the Act, Professor Ely discusses
Ragan, Woods, and Cohen. See supra text accompanying notes 38-56. He argues that the
Court decided Ragan correctly, although the Court applied the wrong standard because the
state's choice of the service of summons as the event that tolls the statute of limitations may
be substantive. The statute guarantees the right to "breathe easy" at the end of two years
1985] 599
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Professor Ely takes a different approach to the Federal Rules
of Evidence. 0 7 He recognizes that because Congress, not the Court,
promulgated the Rules of Evidence, the REA is not in issue, and
only the Constitution limits Congress' power to enact rules. For
example, Congress could pass a rule abolishing state privileges be-
cause arguably it would be procedural. 10 8 Professor Ely proposes,
however, that Congress should be aware that enacting this kind of
rule ignores a view of federalism that has "throughout our history
been imposed on the allocation of lawmaking authority in connec-
tion with diversity jurisdiction.' ' 09 Professor Ely, therefore, is
aware of the congressional power to promulgate procedural rules
that abridge substantive rights, but he believes that federalism
concerns will, or at least should, guide Congress." 0
Professor Burbank criticizes scholars and jurists for consigning
the legislative history of the Act to "oblivion.""' He believes that
the history reflects the primary focus of the Act: allocating power
unless notified otherwise. Ely, supra note 5, at 731. Professor Ely also suggests that the
statute in Woods, which denied jurisdiction to some corporations, could have had the sub-
stantive goal of encouraging corporate qualification. Id. at 728. In Cohen the state statute
intended to deter the small stockholder's "strike suit" to harass and coerce settlement. Ac-
cording to Ely, the substantive purpose of the statute was to stop the stockholder from
acting in bad faith. Id. at 729. He concludes that because the statutes in Ragan, Woods, and
Cohen did more than improve the process of conducting a lawsuit, the Federal Rules should
not have supplanted the statutes, in light of the second sentence of the REA.
107. See Ely, supra note 5, at 740.
108. Id.
109. Id. Professor Ely points out that, considering all the ways in which Congress has
power to displace state law, the realization that Congress has broad power to promulgate
rules that displace state law in diversity cases becomes considerably less frightening. Id. at
706 n.77. Ely contends that no reason exists in the diversity jurisdiction context to be less
trustworthy of the sensitivity of the political process to potential administrative nightmares
and legitimate claims of local control. Professor Ely cites RDA, the REA, and Congress'
recent intervention and revision of the Federal Rules of Evidence as examples of congres-
sional sensitivity to legitimate claims of local control. Id.
110. Professor Ely published his theory before Congress enacted the Federal Rules of
Evidence. In line with his "warning," Congress substituted Rule 501, which refers to state
law on privileges in cases under state substantive law, for the Court's version. As stated in
the Hearings, the rules as proposed encroached on legislative prerogatives and, by abrogat-
ing state privileges, violated principles of federalism. Hearings, supra note 12, at 171; see
also S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 11 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051, 7052-53 (discussing Rule 501 and the controversial nature of the proposed
rules on privileges).
111. Burbank, supra note 72, at 1024-26. Professor Burbank criticized several Su-
preme Court decisions. Concerning Hanna, he declared, "the case gave new life to another
myth"-federalism. Id. at 1035. Referring to Sibbach, he stated that the court erroneously
implied that the substance-procedure dichotomy had its roots in federalism concerns. Id. at
1108. Professor Burbank also regrets the Court's "hypersensitivity" regarding the displace-
ment of state law. Id. at 1187.
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between the Supreme Court as rulemaker and Congress." 2 Profes-
sor Burbank argues in favor of the significant interpretive value of
the pre-1934 history. 1" 3 He recalls that in cases in which the re-
ports and debates preceding passage of legislation by Congress
have been uninformative, the Court has considered materials from
prior sessions of Congress when the Act in question has remained
constant and the language of the original bill was carried forward
into the act.1 4 In reference to the REA, Professor Burbank notes
that the bill before Congress in 1934 essentially was unchanged
from the 1924 version. 115 Conceding that a gap of several years ex-
isted between the consideration of the bill and its enactment, Bur-
bank finds that nothing happened in the interim to suggest that
Congress sought to achieve a different purpose in using the identi-
cal language. 116 Professor Burbank also argues that the ABA mate-
112. Id. at 1025 passim.
The legislative history of the Act traces nearly half a century of efforts to devise a
uniform set of federal procedure rules. The American Bar Association (ABA) Committee on
Uniformity of Procedure and Comparative Law became active in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. In 1911 the Supreme Court began to revise its Equity rules. Id. at 1048. In the follow-
ing year, the Report of the ABA Committee on Judicial Administration and Remedial Pro-
cedure recommended that Congress adopt the federal model of uniform procedure that the
Supreme Court had prepared. The ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial Procedure collabo-
rated with Judge Clayton, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, in preparing a bill
that was introduced in both houses of Congress. At the request of the ABA, the House
Judiciary Committee held hearings on the Clayton Bill in 1914. Hearings on ABA Bill
Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1914). The 1914 House
Report emphasized that the bill represented an equitable division of power between the
Supreme Court and Congress. H.R. REP. No. 462, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 14-15 (1914).
In 1923 Senator Cummins and Chief Justice Taft rewrote the uniform federal proce-
dural bill, introducing the two sentences of the present REA almost verbatim. Burbank,
supra note 72, at 1071-75; see S. 2061, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 65 CONG. REc. 1074 (1924) (the
Cummins bill). According to the draftsmen, they designed the sentence to provide that the
rules shall not abridge substantive rights to emphasize that Congress could not confer legis-
lative power upon the Supreme Court. Burbank, supra note 72, at 1073 (quoting letter from
the Honorable Albert B. Cummins to the Honorable William H. Taft (Dec. 17, 1923)) (Wil-
liam Howard Taft Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., reel 259). In 1926 the
Senate Judiciary Committee stated that the bill's grant to make rules governing the practice
and procedure of courts did not extend any power to affect substantive rights or remedies. S.
REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 9 (1926). The Committee reasoned that these matters
were not "mere procedure" but were "solely within the legislative power." Id. Controversy
arose over the scope of the grant of power to the Court and the bill did not reach a vote in
the Senate. Burbank, supra note 72, at 1085-89. In 1934 the bill was reintroduced and be-
came law in almost the same form as the original version. Id. at 1097; see Act of June 19,
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064; cf. S. 2061, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 65 CONG. REC. 1074
(1924) (the original version-the Cummins Bill).
113. Burbank, supra note 72, at 1098-1101.
114. Id. at 1098-99.
115. Id. at 1099.
116. Id.
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rial concerning the uniform federal procedure bill is helpful in in-
terpreting the REA because the congressional materials are
ambiguous." 7 Finally, he reasons that because ambiguity exists,
the public history of the time and historical and jurisprudential
perspectives give meaning to the Act.""
Although Professor Burbank concedes that the foregoing his-
torical interpretation is "delicate," he nevertheless constructs a de-
finitive purpose from these materials." 9 His conclusion-that Con-
gress intended the REA to ensure congressional/judicial separation
in rulemaking-is inconsistent with the history of the time because
it does not consider federalism. Although the Supreme Court de-
cided Erie in 1938, concern with state powers existed before then.
In fact, some commentators refer to that concern as the "pervasive
problem of federalism."' 120 In light of the ever present issue of fed-
eralism, the REA must encompass more than just a purpose to al-
locate federal power. ABA materials and hearings on bills that
Congress never passed cannot furnish the only means by which to
interpret the Act. The structure and language of the Act suggest a
congressional concern with substantive rights, and federalism is
the doctrine that protects state substantive law.121 The Supreme
Court has recognized federalism considerations in both the RDA
and the REA context. In addition, Congress made changes in the
Court's proposed Rules of Evidence to protect state substantive
law and to preserve federalism. 22 By intervening, Congress en-
forced the limitation in the second sentence of the REA. 123 Finally,
many commentators agree that Congress has demonstrated a sensi-
tivity to state law.1
24
117. Id. at 1100-01.
118. Id. at 1101.
119. Id.
120. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 85, at 578.
121. Professor Burbank contends that the pre-1934 history makes clear that "the pro-
tection of state law was deemed a probable effect, rather than the purpose of, a limitation
designed to allocate lawmaking power between federal institutions." Burbank, supra note
72, at 1106. To label the protection of state law an "effect," however, is misleading. While
the primary purpose of the Act may have been to allocate power between the Court and
Congress, this assumption does not foreclose the possibility that Congress also wanted to
protect state law as a corollary, or at least a secondary, purpose. By preserving the alloca-
tion of power, Congress preserved its power over substantive law, and in the tradition of
federalism, Congress probably intended to protect rather than abridge already existing state
substantive law. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
122. Hearings, supra note 12, at 171; see Ely, supra note 5, at 719.
123. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 401.
124. See D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, at 264-65; Wellborn, supra note 5,
at 401. See generally Ely, supra note 5. Professor Burbank feels that these commentators
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C. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a)
Before Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 43(a) was the law of evidence in the
federal courts in civil cases. 125 Treatment of federal-state conflicts
under the rule, therefore, is enlightening to the discussion of the
Rule 407 conflict. Rule 43(a) established a three-part test, and
courts used the rule to admit, rather than exclude, evidence.
126
During the rule's tenure, few federal statutes addressed evidence in
civil cases, and courts cited even fewer evidentiary rules in federal
equity cases. 27 A conflict between a federal and a state rule, there-
fore, would have been rare if the courts had construed the rule nar-
rowly. Courts, however, interpreted the rule liberally for two rea-
sons. First, courts had an expansive view of the "federal equity"
ground of admissibility.1 28 Second, because courts thought of Rule
43(a) as a rule of admissibility, the idea arose that federal courts
possessed the inherent power to admit evidence that did not even
fit within the three categories of Rule 43(a).2
In Monarch Insurance Co. v. Spach'30 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit approached a federal-state
conflict as an Erie problem and applied a hybrid RDA-REA test.
Monarch was one of the rare cases that faced the Erie problem
squarely under Rule 43(a).131 Other courts had refused to follow
state exclusionary rules in the face of a conflict, but reached this
decision with little analysis.32 In Monarch the state statute man-
have failed to do adequate research. "Scholars and law reformers both need to set priorities
on original investigation. Over time, one person's neglect becomes another's ignorance."
Burbank, supra note 72, at 1024.
125. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE- Crm § 2403
(1971); Wellborn, supra note 5, at 406-08.
The rule provided in part:
All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the United
States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of the United
States on the hearing of suits in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the
courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court is held.
FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (substantially amended 1975).
126. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 125, at 313.
127. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 407.
128. 9 C, WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 125, at 316; Wellborn, supra note 5, at 407;
see Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960); infra text accompanying notes
130-43 (discussing Monarch).
129. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 125, at 319; Wellborn, supra note 5, at 407.
130. 281 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1960).
131. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 125, at 322-24.
132. Id.; see, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Bohlman, 328 F.2d 289, 293-94 (10th Cir.
1964) (stating that questions of evidence are procedural not substantive); Hambrice v. F. W.
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dated exclusion of evidence that was admissible under Rule
43(a).133 The court referred to Erie and York,"-" but reasoned that
the court should balance countervailing policy considerations
against the outcome determinative test. 33 Two of these considera-
tions, according to the court, were the historic purpose of the fed-
eral rules-to establish uniformity in federal procedure-and the
forces that led Congress to pass the REA. 36 The court found that
the Rules of Evidence were mostly procedural, but could affect
substantive rights as well.13 7 The court, however, concluded that
the very presence of Rule 43(a) in the Federal Rules proved that it
was procedural. The court reasoned that the Supreme Court was
aware of the limits of its power under the REA when the Court
decided to include Rule 43 in the Federal Rules. The Fifth Circuit,
therefore, found that concerning admissibility at least, the Rules
of Evidence were procedural. 38
According to the Monarch court, resolving a conflict between
state and federal rules of evidence is a two-step process. The first
step is to determine whether the evidence is admissible under Rule
43(a). The court gave an expansive reading to prior federal equity
practice and held that the evidence was admissible."3 9 The second
step is to decide whether any considerations would call for exclud-
ing the evidence. 40 The court stated that Erie, in some situations,
would limit Rule 43(a).J4 1 The court held that it had to undertake
an analysis of the nature of the state policy behind the rule of ex-
Woolworth Co., 290 F.2d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1961) (same); Gillespie v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Soc'y, 152 F. Supp. 109, 111 (W.D. PA. 1957) (same).
133. Monarch, 281 F.2d at 404. The state rule excluded written statements by injured
parties who did not have the opportunity on demand to see those statements. Id. at 401.
134. Id. at 404-05.
135. Id. at 406-08; see Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537-38
(1958) (the federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact questions is a counter-
vailing consideration to the outcome determinative test).
136. Monarch, 281 F.2d at 408.
137. Id. The court emphasized that "many so called procedural rules may represent
local policy. . . . [S]uch rules in that sort of context are sometimes indistinguishable from
principles traditionally regarded as substantive." Id.
138. Id. at 409. The court's attempt to prove that the rules are procedural is weak at
best. The Supreme Court also thought that the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence were
appropriate, yet Congress disagreed. Thus, relying solely on the Supreme Court's opinion of
what is appropriate is misleading. In addition, the Monarch court implied that exclusionary
rules, as opposed to rules of admissibility, are substantive. The court, therefore, cleared
Rule 43(a) by declaring that it was a rule of admissibility. Id. at 409-10.
139. Id. at 411.
140. Id. at 410.
141. Id.
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clusion in light of the outcome determinative test. The court found
no significant effect on the outcome would occur if it admitted the
evidence. 142 The second step of the analysis focused on "other fac-
tors implicit in the Erie concept"'1 3 that are more in line with an
REA analyses. The court's reasoning is muddied because it applied
a hybrid of RDA and REA analysis. The use of the outcome deter-
mination test, the references to the REA, and the overall labeling
of the test as applying "Erie considerations" confuse the appropri-
ate standards. The opinion, nonetheless, clearly illustrates a sensi-
tivity to state substantive policy under Rule 43(a).
D. The Federal Rules of Evidence
Before Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence, 4 1 the
body of evidence law that the federal courts applied was complex
and impractical.145 The draftsmen of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure recognized the need but lacked the time and resources
to deal comprehensively with evidence.'4 Rule 43(a) was an unsat-
isfactory "stop-gap" measure in light of the need for uniformity in
federal procedure. 47 Controversies, however, arose concerning the
nature of rules of evidence and the scope of the power that Con-
gress gave the Court through the REA. On the one hand, some
scholars proposed that rules of evidence are procedural, rather
than substantive. 148 Professor Morgan, for instance, reasoned that
rules of evidence are necessarily procedural, basing that conclusion
on his doctrinal approach to the terms "substance" or "procedure":
rules of substance determine the legal relations between parties;
rules of procedure guide the judicial system in fact-finding. 49 Pro-
fessor Morgan noted, for example, that when legislatures draft
codes of procedure, they include rules governing not only the com-
petency but also the privileges of witnesses. 50 He reasoned, there-
142. Id. at 412.
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. For a detailed history of the rules, see P. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 1-9 (Supp. 1975); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1007 (1969 & Supp. 1983).
145. Weinstein, supra note 82, at 354; Wellborn, supra note 5, at 372.
146. Weinstein, supra note 82, at 354.
147. Id. at 355; cf. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 373.
148. See, e.g., Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform, 76 HARv. L. REV. 275,
277-82 (1962); Morgan, Rules of Evidence-Substantive or Procedural, 10 VAND. L. REV.
467, 483-84 (1957).
149. Morgan, supra note 148, at 468.
150. Id. at 483.
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fore, that when a legislature delegates to the courts the function of
regulating procedure, as Congress did in the REA, the legislature
intends to include the subject of privileges. 151
Judge Weinstein, on the other hand, recognized that certain
evidence rules are substantive. 15 He developed the thesis that evi-
dence law has three kinds of rules: (1) rules that aim at ensuring
accurate fact-finding; (2) rules that prescribe burdens of proof and
presumptions; and (3) rules that further wholly extrinsic poli-
cies.153 The third category includes rules designed to achieve inde-
pendent substantive impact.' 5 According to Judge Weinstein, this
third group of rules presented the most difficult problem for the
drafters of the federal uniform rules of evidence.' 55 Judge Wein-
stein proposed three possible approaches to this problem: (1) apply
the state rule in all cases; (2) ignore the state rule in all cases; and
(3) apply the state rule only to issues to which state substantive
law is material. 55 Weighing the concerns on each side, Judge
Weinstein concluded that a federal rule is useful, but should in-
clude a provision deferring to state evidence law in cases predi-
cated on state substantive law. 57 Under Judge Weinstein's ap-
proach, the law of the state that creates the privileges, or makes
evidence admissible or inadmissible, or makes witnesses competent
or incompetent on the basis of state substantive policies, should
control.158
The Supreme Court's proposed Rules of Evidence incorpo-
rated little state evidence law by reference, notwithstanding a con-
siderable body of critical opinion favoring more deference to state
law. 5M As Judge Weinstein had feared, the rules threatened to en-
croach upon areas of substantive law. Consequently, Congress de-
ferred the effective date of the rules until it had an opportunity to
consider and approve each rule. 60 The main issues facing Congress
were whether the Supreme Court had the power to adopt substan-
151. Id.
152. Weinstein, supra note 82, at 370.
153. Id. at 361.
154. Id. at 370.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 371
157. Id. at 373.
158. Id. at 376.
159. Welborn, supra note 5, at 373-74; see Weinberg, Choice of Law and the Pro-
posed Federal Rules of Evidence, 122 U. PA. L. R.v. 594, 625-26, 629 (1974); Weinstein,
supra note 82, at 363, 370, 373, 375-76.
160. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
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tive rules'' and whether the proposed rules violated principles of
federalism.16 2 Former Supreme Court Justice Arthur J. Goldberg
testified that the legislative history of the REA clearly indicated
that Congress intended to limit the power of the Court to rules of
practice and procedure of the kind Goldberg characterized as
"housekeeping rules."' s Quoting the second sentence of the REA,
Goldberg reasoned that the Supreme Court had no delegated
power to approve rules of evidence that concerned matters of "sub-
stance."'1 4 He testified that privileges, burdens of proof, and con-
clusive presumptions were substantive issues and thus beyond the
rulemaking power.165 Goldberg also cited Erie for the proposition
that "federal courts in diversity cases have no power to create and
apply substantive federal law in conflict with the laws of the states
where the courts preside.' 1-6  Goldberg elevated the Erie principle
of federalism to a constitutional level and had trouble with the
proposed rules for that reason.
The testimony of two representatives of the Washington
Council of Lawyers16 7 also referred to the scope of the rulemaking
power and the problem of federalism.168 They believed that Article
V of the Proposed Rules of Evidence, which abolished all state-
created privileges, infringed on legislative responsibility."6 9 More-
over, because of the special nature of rules of privilege as expres-
sions of state policy, both representatives felt that total abrogation
of state privileges by federal judicial rulemaking raised the most
fundamental problems of federalism. 17 0 The representatives testi-
161. Hearings, supra note 12, at 142 (testimony of former Supreme Court Justice Ar-
thur J. Goldberg). Goldberg's testimony supports Professor Burbank's analysis that the
REA is concerned with the allocation of power between the Court and Congress. See supra
text accompanying note 112. Goldberg's testimony, however, also referred to Erie and prin-
ciples of federalism. See Hearings, supra note 12, at 156.
162. Hearings, supra note 12, at 171 (testimony of Charles R. Halpern & George T.
Frampton, Jr., on behalf of the Washington Council of Lawyers). This testimony runs
counter to Professor Burbank's analysis and supports the analyses of Professors Ely and
Wellborn.
163. Id. at 142-43.
164. Id. at 155.
165. Id. at 156.
166. Id.
167. Charles R. Halpern & George T. Frampton, Jr., spoke as representatives of the
Washington Council of Lawyers, a professional organization formed in 1971. The organiza-
tion does pro bono work and sends its representatives to testify in front of Congress on legal
matters.





fled that the social value of certain relationships was a paramount
state interest worthy of protection.
171
In light of the debates, proposals, and hearings, Congress
changed the rules that the Court drafted. 17 Certain of the changes
Congress fashioned were in response to complaints of infringement
of state substantive law.'7 S For example, Congress replaced the
Court's specific privilege rules with Rule 501, which refers to state
law on privileges in cases in which state substantive law governs.174
Congress also included other changes to make the rules conform to
state substantive law by providing a reference to state law in Rule
601, which discusses the competency of witnesses.7 5 Congress,
therefore, changed the rules that were most "conspicuously vulner-
able" to a challenge under the second sentence of the REA. 17 Con-
gress was careful to ensure that the uniform procedural rules did
not infringe on state substantive law. 7 7 Applying the constitu-
tional standard to rules of evidence, therefore, although proper be-
cause of the method of promulgation, would erode the very reason
that Congress intervened and revised the rules of evidence. 178
Courts, nevertheless, generally use the Constitution to deter-
mine whether a Federal Rule of Evidence is valid:179 If a rule is
procedural, then it is valid. 80 Under this approach, all of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence are valid."' Commentators disagree over
whether the. courts' approach is correct.18 2 The debate centers
171. Id.
172. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
173. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 401.
174. FED. R. Evm. 501; see S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1974); H.R. REP.
No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1973).
175. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973). Rule 601 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence states in part: "With respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State
law supplies the Rule of decision, the competency of a witness shall be determined in accor-
dance with State law." FEn. R Evw. 601.
176. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 401.
177. Id. at 402.
178. Id. at 406.
179. See Rioux v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 582 F. Supp. 620, 624 (D. Me. 1984); cf. Hanna,
380 U.S. at 471-72. Rioux referred to Hanna in applying the constitutional standard to acts
of Congress, such as the Rules of Evidence. Commentators also support this position. See
Ely, supra note 5, at 698, 740; Wellborn, supra note 5, at 398.
180. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472; Wellborn, supra note 5, at 398.
181. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 398, 400. Professor Wellborn, however, argues that,
with respect to the displacement of state law, the second sentence of the REA also should
guide the construction of the rules. Id. at 398 n.154.
182. Professor Wright has argued that the Erie doctrine of federalism affects the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence the least because the rules are arguably procedural. 19 C. WRmHT &
A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURM JURISDICTION § 4512, at 190 (1982). He con-
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around the extent to which courts should consider the second sen-
tence of the REA in evaluating rules of evidence, or simply rubber-
stamp the rules without considering issues of federalism.
III. THE INSTANT CONFLICT
A. Federal Rule of Evidence 407
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 excludes evidence of subsequent
remedial measures as proof of negligence or culpable conduct. 1 8
The second sentence of the rule admits evidence when a party of-
fers it for purposes other than to prove fault.184 The scope of the
rule includes any postaccident change, repair, or precaution. It
codifies the almost uniform practice in American courts of exclud-
ing evidence of subsequent repair. 185 The rule applies most often in
manufacturer liability cases to exclude evidence of subsequent
modifications in product designs. 86
cedes that a varied collection of state rules exist that courts sometimes consider as rules of
evidence, when in fact they serve as substantive state policies. Professor Wright realizes that
rules such as parole evidence, statutes of fraud, and other state rules are more properly
substantive laws within the meaning of Erie, but he concludes that the Federal Rules of
Evidence do not affect or alter these "substantive rules of evidence." Id. at 194-95; see also
Ely, supra note 5, at 740 (contending that the REA is not the appropriate standard by
which to measure the rules). Professor Wellborn, on the other hand, fears that the Federal
Rules of Evidence can derogate state substantive law. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 406. He
focuses primarily on the impact of relevancy rules. Professor Wellborn proposes that in light
of the historical background of the Rules of Evidence, the REA is an appropriate guideline
for applying the rules, and the Court should interpret the rules as falling within the com-
mand of the second sentence of the Act. Id. at 402.
183. Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admis-
sible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This Rule
does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for
another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary
measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
FED. R. Evm. 407.
184. Id.
185. D. LOiSELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, at 235; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 9, at 5.
186. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 9, at 5. Before the Federal Rules of
Evidence, the court applied the common-law exclusionary rule to product design cases. See
Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819, 822-23 (2d Cir. 1965) (safety mechanism
installed in rifle to prevent accidental discharge); Cox v. General Elec. Co., 302 F.2d 389, 390
(6th Cir. 1962) (change in washing machine to prevent opening before spinning stopped).
Some circuits also have applied Rule 407 to products liability actions. See Hall v. American
Steamship Co., 688 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1982); Oberst v. International Harvester Co., 640
F.2d 863 (7th Cir. 1980). The Eighth Circuit, however, will not extend the rule to products
liability cases. See Unterberger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1980). Finally, some
states expressly admit subsequent repair evidence in products liability actions. See supra
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
The primary reason for excluding evidence under Rule 407 is
to promote the social policy of encouraging people to take safety
precautions, especially after an accident has proven that precau-
tions were needed.18 7 The Advisory Committee Note to rule 407
states that the rule rests on two grounds. 188 First, the con-
duct-improving safety after an accident-is not an admission of
negligence because the conduct is equally consistent with injury by
mere accident or contributory negligence. 189 The Committee, how-
ever, concedes that under the Federal Rules' liberal theory of rele-
vancy, the first ground alone would not justify excluding the evi-
dence because the inference that the conduct is an admission is
still possible.1 90 Federal Rule of Evidence 401 provides a low
threshold for relevancy,19" ' which evidence of subsequent repairs ar-
guably meets. Thus, the Advisory Committee identifies a second,
"more impressive" ground for excluding evidence: the social policy
of encouraging people to take steps to promote safety.192 The Advi-
sory Committee, therefore, recognizes that the procedural grounds
for the rule are tenuous; the main reason for the rule is the social
policy.
Because Rule 407 rests in large part on an extrinsic policy,193
it may affect substantive rights. Professor Schwartz called this
problem to the attention of the House Judiciary Committee at the
hearings on the proposed rules.194 He told Congress that Rule 407
ignores the Erie principle because the rule is not based on rele-
vance, but on the goal of encouraging repairs. 95 He concluded that
note 17 (citing relevant state statutes).
187. Hall v. American Steamship Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1067 (6th Cir. 1982); Werner v.
Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981); Stephan v.
Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819, 823 (2d Cir. 1965) (applying state version of Rule 407);
FED. R. Evm. 407 advisory committee note; see D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, at
235; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 9, at 7.
188. FED. R. EviD. 407 advisory committee note.
189. Id.
190. See infra text accompanying notes 287-89 for a discussion of the probative value
of the evidence.
191. Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "'Relevant evidence' means
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." FED. R. Evm. 401.
192. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee note.
193. D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, at 235.
194. Hearings, supra note 12, at 302-03 (letter of July 31, 1973, Professor Victor E.
Schwartz to the Honorable William L. Hungate).
195. Id. at 303. Professor Schwartz also asserted that the rule would not achieve this
substantive goal because many defendants would make repairs even if the evidence were
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whether such evidence is excluded should be a matter of state pol-
icy.19 6 Congress ignored Professor Schwartz' point.197 This over-
sight, however, is understandable because at the time most states
recognized Rule 407,198 and Congress changed only rules that were
most conspicuously vulnerable to an REA challenge. 99 Maine did
not adopt a rule contrary to Rule 407 until after Congress had en-
acted the Federal Rules. The rules of privilege and competency
were highly controversial evidence rules before and after the draft
because of the various state rules and underlying policies. 00 Rule
407 remained intact, however, because at the time there was no
conflict with state law.
B. Maine Rule of Evidence 407
Unlike Federal Rule of Evidence 407, Maine Rule of Evidence
407 admits evidence of subsequent remedial measures for any pur-
pose, including to prove negligence. 20 1 The Supreme Judicial Court
of Maine promulgated the state rules of evidence in 1975, upon the
recommendation of the state advisory committee.0 2 The advisory
committee, prompted to draft uniform rules for the state by the
United States Supreme Court's promulgation of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, nevertheless did not intend to conform to the Federal
Rules merely for the sake of conformity.20 3 In some instances, in-
cluding Rule 407, the committee chose rules that differed from
both existing Maine law and the proposed Federal Rules. °4 The
basic premise behind adopting the Maine rules, as with the Federal
Rules of Evidence, was an increased desire to admit evidence.205
When Maine promulgated Rule 407, it was contrary to Maine
law, to the generally prevailing state law, and to the Federal
admissible. Id.
196. Id.
197. D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 9, at 236.
198. Id. at 235, 265; 2 J. WEINsTErN & M. BERGER, supra note 9, at 5.
199. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 401. For example, Congress changed the rules of privi-
lege and competency, which, unlike Rule 407, were highly controversial before and after the
draft because of the various state rules and underlying policies.
200. See id.
201. Maine Rule of Evidence 407 states in part: "[W]hen, after an event, measures are
taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of
the subsequent measures is admissible." ME R. Evw. 407(a); see Note, supra note 15 (dis-
cussing the Maine Rule).
202. Field, supra note 16, at 203-04.
203. Id. at 204-05.
204. Id. at 206, 217.
205. Id. at 207.
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Rule.206 The rule evoked more comment in the public meetings on
the rules than any other proposed rule and elicited dissenting
views from two members of the Maine Advisory Committee.
207
Professor Field, then a consultant to the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court's Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence and an adviser
to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, provided a commentary
to accompany the rules.20 8 In the commentary, Professor Field re-
jects the argument that Federal Rule 407 is based on the irrele-
vancy of evidence of subsequent repairs, because the broad defini-
tion of relevancy in Rule 401 would admit such evidence. 20 9 He also
refutes the remaining ground for the exclusionary principle--"the
sound public policy of encouraging repairs." 210 Professor Field rea-
sons that Federal Rule 407 largely defeats this policy by admitting
evidence for purposes other than proving negligence, 21' such as
proving ownership or control. According to Professor Field, a limit-
ing instruction to a jury to consider the evidence for only a narrow
purpose is unlikely to be effective.212 The Advisers' note to the
Maine rule also expressly refutes the repair policy rationale.2 13
Both Professor Field and the Advisers' note conclude that a judge
may bring Rule 403 into play to exclude the evidence if the danger
of prejudice substantially will outweigh the probative value of the
evidence.21 4 Professor Field's comments and the Advisers' note,
however, indicate that, in the majority of cases, the social policy
behind Federal Rule 407 and the argument that evidence of subse-
quent repairs is irrelevant were not persuasive to the Maine Su-
preme Court.
206. Id. at 217.
207. Id.
208. See R. FIELD & P. MURRAY, MAINE EVIDENCE § 407.1, at 78 (1976) (commentary to
the rule) [hereinafter cited as Commentary].
209. See id.
210. Id.; see Field, supra note 16, at 218.
211. Commentary, supra note 208, at 78; Field, supra note 16, at 218.
212. Commentary, supra note 208, at 79. Professor Field also contends that the "cold-
blooded" defendant that the federal rule envisions would be aware of the many exceptions
to the rule and that "enlightened self-interest" would lead a defendant to make repairs,
even though the court might admit evidence of the action to prove fault. Id.
213. ME. R Evm. 407 advisers' note.
214. Commentary, supra note 208, at 79; ME. R Evm. 407 advisers' note. A clear case
for using Rule 403 is when the defendant makes a change for reasons unrelated to the haz-
ard. Field, supra note 16, at 218.
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C. Rioux v. Daniel International Corp.
In Rioux v. Daniel International Corp.215 the United States
District Court for Maine held that Federal Rule of Evidence 407
applied in a diversity action in federal court and thus preempted
Maine Rule 407.216 The plaintiff in Rioux sued for the wrongful
death of the defendant's employee, who died when a falling section
of concrete-filled steel pipe struck him on the head.217 The plaintiff
contended that the pipe fell because it did not have adequate sup-
port.218 The plaintiff tried to introduce evidence, pursuant to
Maine Rule 407, to demonstrate that after the accident the defen-
dant had changed its method of securing the piping.219 The plain-
tiff argued that the evidence was relevant to show negligence.22 °
The defendant filed a pretrial motion pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 to exclude the plaintiff's evidence. 21
The court first focused on Hanna v. Pumer2 22 and the argua-
bly-procedural standard in the REA test.2 3 The Rioux court held
that even if the REA applied, the federal rule was valid because it
was procedural.224 The court stressed that no court ever had struck
down a federal rule of procedure or evidence as exceeding Con-
gress' constitutional power.225
The Rioux court also relied on the circumstances surrounding
the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court
noted that when Congress intervened and rewrote and enacted the
rules of evidence,226 Congress removed the rules from review under
the RDA and the REA.227 The court concluded that the Constitu-
tion alone determined the validity of the rules.22 8 The court then
found that because the rules of evidence are arguably procedural,
215. 582 F. Supp. 620 (D. Me. 1984).
216. Id. at 625.
217. Id. at 622.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 622.
221. Id. at 621.
222. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
223. Id. at 472. See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Hanna and the REA test.
224. Rioux, 582 F. Supp. at 624.
225. Id.
226. See supra notes 160-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of congressional
intervention in the rules of evidence.




they are clearly constitutional.229 To bolster its conclusion, the
court noted that Congress had deferred to state evidentiary laws
by explicitly incorporating certain state evidentiary practices into
other rules of evidence.230 The court reasoned that because Con-
gress had enacted a uniform rule for admission of subsequent re-
medial measures, rather than referring to state law, as in Rule 302,
Rule 501, and Rule 601, Rule 407 was intended to supersede state
law and was valid unless unconstitutional under the Hanna test.
231
The court refused to hold that Congress exceeded its constitutional
power in promulgating the rule or that Congress erroneously con-
sidered the recommendations of the Advisory Committee and the
Supreme Court.
2 2
D. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation and French
v. Fleet Carrier Corp.
Less than two months before the decision in Rioux v. Daniel,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that
Federal Rule of Evidence 407 did not preempt a contrary state
rule.233 In Moe the plaintiffs brought a products liability action
seeking damages for wrongful death arising from an airplane crash,
contending that the crash was due to a defective flight control sys-
tem. 34 The plaintiffs sought to admit evidence of a document that
the defendant manufacturer had published that warned of a
known defect in the aircraft.235 The trial court rejected the evi-
dence on the basis of Federal Rules 407 and 403.236 The court de-
termined that state law did not govern Rule 407.237 The plaintiffs
appealed, arguing that under state law the court should admit evi-
229. Id. The court applied the constitutional standard that the Supreme Court estab-
lished in Hanna. See supra text accompanying note 59.
230. Rioux, 582 F. Supp. at 625; see supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
231. Rioux, 582 F. Supp. at 625; see supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Rule 501 and Rule 601). Rule 302 states: "in civil actions ... the effect of a pre-
sumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision is determined in accordance with State law." FED. R. EVID. 302.
232. Rioux, 582 F. Supp. at 625.
233. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir.
1984).
234. Id. at 920-21.
235. Id. at 923.
236. Id. at 930. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides: Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. FED. R. EvD. 403.
237. Moe, 727 F.2d at 931.
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dence in a products liability action of the manufacturer's postacci-
dent warning.
2 8
The Tenth Circuit disagreed with the trial court's conclusion
that the Federal Rules of Evidence exclusively govern the admissi-
bility of evidence in diversity actions.2 9 The court held that the
question whether to exclude subsequent remedial measures is a
matter of state law. 24 0 The court focused specifically on the conflict
between Maine Rule 407 and Federal Rule 407.24'1 The court rea-
soned that because products liability, like any tort action, is a state
cause of action, and because the social policy of repairs is a state
policy decision, a court should apply a state rule that conflicts with
Rule 407 in a diversity action. 4 2 The court, however, held that no
harm had resulted from the trial court's ruling that Federal Rule
407 applied because the trial court had expressly excluded the evi-
dence under Rule 403.243 The circuit court, therefore, affirmed the
judgment. Although the court decided the case on a different
ground, the court nonetheless held that the state rule should pre-
empt Federal Rule 407 in diversity cases.
In French v. Fleet Carrier Corp.,244 decided less than one
month after Rioux, the District Court of Maine responded to the
Moe holding in an extensive footnote.245 The district court again
focused on the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which the court accused the Tenth Circuit of failing to consider.
246
238. Id. at 931; see Good v. A. B. Chance Co., 39 Colo. App. 70, 565 P.2d 217 (1977)
(establishing controlling state law in Colorado); Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal.
3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812 (1974). The Good court followed the reasoning in
Ault that in a products liability action evidence of postaccident repair has a direct bearing
on liability.
239. 727 F.2d at 931.
240. Id. at 932.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 934. The trial court excluded the evidence under Rule 403 because of unfair
prejudice and jury confusion, and the appellate court held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion. Id.
244. 101 F.R.D. 369 (D. Me. 1984). In French the plaintiffs' jury trial demand was not
timely under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 370 n.2; see FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c).
The plaintiffs argued that the Maine rule of procedure should apply. 101 F.R.D. at 370. The
court held that because the federal rule was arguably procedural, the court did not have to
apply the state rule. Id. at 372. This holding is proper because the disagreement between
the rules is procedural, relating to the fairness and efficiency of the lawsuit. Nonetheless,
perhaps the court should have examined whether the state rule was substantive because the
plaintiffs sought a jury trial. See City of Aurora v. Erwin, 706 F.2d 295, 298 (10th Cir. 1983)
(state may grant the right to a jury trial for either procedural or substantive reasons).




The district court reasoned that, although all rules have underlying
policy considerations, the Supreme Court had held that the federal
courts should apply the federal rules in diversity cases to the ex-
tent that the rules can "rationally be classified" as procedural.24 7
The district court interpreted this language as a determination by
Congress and the Court that the authority of federal courts to gov-
ern their own proceedings takes precedence over state policy con-
siderations.24 The court concluded that its interpretation did not
violate Erie249 and that the better approach to the problem was to
follow Hanna.5 °
IV. THE PROPOSED APPROACH
This Note contends that the Rioux court's analysis is incom-
plete and proposes a more intensive approach to conflicting state
and federal rules. A more thorough analysis that shows greater def-
erence to state law would conform to the approach that courts and
Congress generally have taken to the federal rules and would agree
with the opinions of jurists and scholars. A three-step approach
would ensure proper emphasis on both principles of federalism and
uniformity of federal procedure. First, the REA is an appropriate
tool to balance conflicting rules, not only because the REA would
have applied to Rule 407 if Congress had not intervened in the
rule's promulgation,2 51 but also because the purpose of Congress'
intervention was to ensure that the rules of evidence were within
the limitations of the REA. s52 In addition, the federal rule should
pass the standards of both sentences of the REA.s53 Second, the
policies underlying the RDA and the Erie line of cases should be a
significant part of the analysis. The twin evils of Erie-forum
shopping and discrimination 254 -are important concerns in any
complete analysis of a federal-state rules conflict. The Tenth Cir-
cuit, the Fifth Circuit, and Congress have considered the issues of
outcome determination and forum shopping in assessing the valid-
247. Id. The court referred to the language in Hanna. See supra text accompanying
note 59.
248. 101 F.R.D. at 371 n.3.
249. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of Erie.
250. 101 F.R.D. at 372 n.3. The court's reference to Hanna seems to mean that rather
than trying to separate substance and procedure, Hanna simplifies the test as solely a deter-
mination of whether the rule is arguably procedural. Id.
251. The Supreme Court reported the rules to Congress under the REA.
252. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 401; see supra text accompanying notes 172-77.
253. See supra notes 57-124 and accompanying text for a discussion of the REA.
254. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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ity of a federal rule.255 Third, a court could interpret the rule nar-
rowly to avoid the conflict with state law. Similarly, Congress or
the Supreme Court should consider the feasibility and propriety of
modifying the federal rule. This final step would entail determin-
ing whether a court can avoid the conflict by narrowing the scope
of the rule.
A. The Rules Enabling Act Analysis
Some commentators and one federal court that has considered
the validity of the Federal Rules of Evidence have opined that the
REA does not apply to conflicts with state evidence rules.256 The
REA is no more than a statutory grant to the judiciary of Con-
gress' constitutional authority to promulgate rules of procedure.
They argue, therefore, that because Congress intervened directly in
the promulgation of the Rules of Evidence, the rules are not sub-
ject to review under the REA but rather under Congress' constitu-
tional authority to promulgate rules. In Hanna v. Plumer, how-
ever, the Supreme Court elevated the REA to the level of a
constitutional standard, implying that Congress passed all of its
constitutional rulemaking authority to the courts when Congress
enacted the REA. Assuming this contention is accurate, the REA,
and the case law and comment it has engendered, is the proper
standard by which to judge a rule that Congress promulgated.
1. Sentence One: Is the Federal Rule Procedural?
To determine whether a rule "really regulates procedure, ' ' 58
or is "arguably procedural, 2 59 as the first sentence of the REA de-
mands, requires a definition of procedure. Procedure is an elusive
and variable concept. According to Professor Ely, a procedural rule
is a rule designed to get at the truth and make the litigation pro-
cess a fair and efficient mechanism for the resolution of disputes. 6 °
Professor Morgan defines procedural rules as guides to judges and
litigants for the use of judicial machinery for finding facts.2 6 1 Fi-
255. See Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th
Cir. 1984); Monarch Ins. Co. v. Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 412 (5th Cir. 1960); H. REP. No. 650,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1973).
256. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hanna.
258. See supra text accompanying note 67.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 80-86.
260. Ely, supra note 5, at 724.
261. Morgan, supra note 148, at 468.
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nally, the Fifth Circuit has indicated that the rules provided for in
the REA establish
[the] machinery for the administration of justice, the modes of proceeding by
which legal rights are enforced; and [the rules] do not purport to deal with
the law which gives or defines such rights,. . . [the rules] provide. . . only
means to the end of achieving substantial justice and are not ends in
themselves.
26
Applying these definitions to Federal Rule 407, the rule clearly
is not procedural. Rule 407 is based primarily, if not solely, upon
social policy considerations and not upon relevancy or a concern
for truthfinding.2 s The Advisory Committee note indicates that
the principal ground for exclusion rests on a social policy of en-
couraging people to take steps to promote safety. 26 4 The purpose of
Rule 407 has nothing to do with the fairness or efficiency of the
litigation process. Nor is the rule a guide for factfinding. Rule 407
seeks to provide an end in itself-safety-and is not a means to
the end of achieving substantial justice. Thus, Federal Rule 407 is
merely a substantive policy in the guise of procedure and, there-
fore, arguably is not procedural. Nonetheless, the rule probably
passes the first sentence of the REA because "arguably proce-
dural" is a low threshold. 65 Assuming the rule could pass sentence
one, however, it still must pass the test of sentence two.
2. Sentence Two: Is the State Rule Substantive?
Although most courts, including the Supreme Court, have not
considered the second sentence of the REA, which expressly pro-
hibits a rule from interfering with substantive law, there is good
reason to believe that Congress intended the sentence to be a sepa-
rate hurdle for federal rules that conflict with state rules. Some
commentators and courts believe that the second sentence of the
REA recognizes that a rule can be procedural and abridge substan-
tive rights.266 This approach is based on the belief that the REA
would not expressly recognize this possibility if it did not intend to
262. Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107, 111 (5th Cir. 1956).
263. See Moe, 727 F.2d at 932; Hall v. American Steamship Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1067
(6th Cir. 1982); Oberst v. International Harvester Co., 640 F.2d 863, 867 n.2 (7th Cir. 1980)
(Swygert, J.- concurring and dissenting in part); see supra text accompanying notes 187-92.
264. FED. R. Evm. 407 advisory committee note.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 180-82 for a discussion of the arguably proce-
dural standard.
266. See Moe, 727 F.2d at 932; Perry v. Allen, 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956); Ely, supra
note 5, at 719; supra text accompanying note 100 (discussing Perry's recognition that a rule
could be procedural and substantive).
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prohibit arguably procedural rules that have substantive effects
from interfering with substantive law.267 Congress apparently was
impressed with this view when it agreed, in response to such feder-
alism concerns, to intervene in the promulgation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. Congress changed many of the rules to protect
against conflicts with state substantive law, overlooking Rule 407
probably only because no actual conflict with state law existed at
the time.2 "
To determine whether a federal rule abridges, alters, or modi-
fies any state substantive right and thus should be prohibited by
the REA, the central issue is whether the conflicting state rule is
substantive. Professor Ely defines a substantive right as a right
granted for some purpose that does not have to do with the fair-
ness or efficiency of the litigation process. 29 He focuses, therefore,
on whether the state rule has any underlying substantive goal or
policy.270 Other commentators and cases take a different approach;
they consider whether the area of law that the rules regulate is
substantive.27 1 This approach views a rule as substantive if it is so
closely tied to the substantive law which it regulates that the rule
becomes a part of the substantive law. A third perspective is Jus-
tice Harlan's approach in Hanna, in which he considered whether
the choice of rule substantially would affect primary decisions re-
specting human conduct that the constitutional system tradition-
ally leaves to state regulation. 72 This subsection considers each of
these approaches in turn.
(a) Underlying State Policies
Under Professor Ely's approach, Maine Rule 407 contains two
potential underlying substantive policies. First, the Maine Rule
could reflect the basic tort policy of compensation-awarding dam-
ages to persons injured due to another's negligent acts. Admitting
267. See Ely, supra note 5, at 719 (second sentence addresses the possibility that a
rule could be procedural and at the same time abridge substantive rights).
268. See supra notes 15-18, 206 and accompanying text.
269. Ely, supra note 5, at 725.
270. Id. at 722.
271. See Moe, 727 F.2d at 932 (discussing the nature of products liability law); Con-
way v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 540 F.2d 837, 838 (5th Cir. 1976) (evidentiary
rule so bound up with state substantive law that court must apply the rule to give full effect
to the law); D. LOUISELL & C. MuzLLER, supra note 9, at 265 (discussing the field of tort
law).
272. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 475; see also I. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 85, at 747
(introducing the "primary decisions respecting human conduct" formula).
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evidence of subsequent repairs could be an attempt to ensure that
every tortfeasor compensates his innocent victims. Perhaps Maine
believes that the value of compensating victims outweighs the risk
of discouraging defendants from making good faith repairs. Apply-
ing the federal rule, therefore, would defeat the substantive policy
underlying the state rule.
Second, the Maine rule may reflect a substantive policy deci-
sion that encouraging repairs is not well served by the federal rule.
The Rioux court noted that the Maine rule allows the evidence "on
the basis of a deliberate policy decision, ' " and then cited Profes-
sor Field's refutation of the repair policy rationale.7 4 By consider-
ing the repair policy and expressly refuting it, therefore, the Maine
committee may have made a policy choice about what promotes
safety and what does not. The federal rule, by imposing the federal
government's views on safety, abridges the power of the state to
establish its own substantive policy.
(b) Nature of the Rule
Professors Louisell and Mueller note that state and federal
Rules 407 regulate tort liability. 7 5 Tort law is clearly substantive.
Consequently, they argue that Rule 407, by the very nature of the
body of law that it regulates, is substantive. In the area of products
liability, the Moe court adopted this theory by holding that a state
rule in variance with Rule 407 "is so closely tied to the substantive
law . . . which it regulates" that courts must use the state rule to
avoid forum shopping.2 6  Similarly, in Conway v. Chemical
Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. 7 the court held that the state rule regu-
lating the admission of evidence of a widow's remarriage in a
wrongful death case was so bound up with state substantive law
that federal courts sitting in Texas should accord the evidence the
same weight as the state courts to give full effect to Texas' sub-
stantive policy.27 8 According to this theory, because the nature of
both state and federal Rules 407 is substantive, courts should give
full effect to the second sentence of the REA by overriding the
federal rule and applying the state rule instead.
273. 582 F. Supp. at 623.
274. See supra text accompanying note 209.
275. D. Lousa.LL & C. MuELLER, supra note 9, at 265.
276. 727 F.2d at 932.
277. 540 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1976).
278. Id at 838.
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(c) Primary Decisions Regarding Human Conduct
Justice Harlan and Professors Hart and Wechsler would apply
the conflicting state rule if the choice of rule affects decisions con-
cerning human conduct that the Constitution traditionally leaves
to state regulation.2 79 If Federal Rule 407 does what the Advisory
Committee intended, the rule will encourage repairs and promote
safety. The rule thus would affect decisions about safety, that the
constitutional system leaves to state regulation. The state police
power over local concerns, such as safety and health, is a well-rec-
ognized principle. 2 0 As Judge Weinstein concludes, Rule 407 does
not address any special federal interest that would override the
traditional allocation of power.28'
(d) Summary
The foregoing analysis concludes that both Federal Rule 407
and state Rule 407 are substantive. The Maine rule, however, by
rejecting the exclusionary rationale behind the federal rule, places
the procedural goal of truthfinding above the substantive goal of
encouraging repairs. The Maine rule, therefore, is suspiciously pro-
cedural. Because the first sentence of the REA is not concerned
with arguably substantive federal rules and the second sentence
does not protect arguably procedural state rules, applying this
analysis to Rule 407 creates a curious stalemate. Factoring in the
concerns of federalism evident in the second sentence of the REA,
279. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); H. HART & H.
WECHSLER, supra note 85, at 747.
280. The Supreme Court often has referred to the extensive scope of the state police
power over local concerns. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976) (the state pos-
sesses broad authority under its police power, exemplified in child labor laws and laws af-
fecting occupational health and safety). Moreover, the interstate commerce cases indirectly
illustrate that safety is a local concern, which the Court has balanced against a national
interest in the free flow of commerce. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450
U.S. 662, 670 (1981) (because safety is traditionally a local concern, regulations that pro-
mote safety are within the state's power to regulate); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice,
434 U.S. 429, 443 (1978) (Court reluctant to invalidate state legislation that aims to promote
safety if the propriety of the local regulation has long been recognized).
281. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 9, at 12. On the other hand, the federal
government can regulate safety or interfere with the state interest in safety. The hook that
the government could use, however, is the commerce clause. Although the objective would
be safety, as in federal food and health regulations, the law is bootstrapped on by the fed-
eral interest in the free flow of commerce. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S.
761, 782 (1945) (holding that the national interest in the free flow of interstate commerce
outweighs the state interest in safety). Obviously, the rulemaking power of the federal court




however, indicates that the REA favors applying the state rule. To
test this conclusion, the policies underlying the RDA are
important.
B. The Policies of the Rules of Decision Act
The RDA is an inappropriate test for a federal rule, but the
policies underlying the RDA-eliminating forum shopping and dis-
crimination-often crop up in contexts other than judge-made
law.2" 2 The strongest example of reliance on these policies is the
legislative history of Congress' intervention into the proposed Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. The House Report commented that article
V, providing for specific rules or privileges, would have promoted
forum shopping but for the changes Congress made.283 The Fifth
Circuit, in Conway,214 expressed concern with forum shopping and
outcome determinative rules in the context of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Professor Wellborn posits that the only reason for a fed-
eral court to follow a state rule is to minimize forum shopping and
unequal treatment.28 5 Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit, in Moe,
held that it must apply a state rule that conflicts with Rule 407 in
a diversity action to promote uniformity and prevent forum shop-
ping.286 Courts, therefore, often consider the policies of the RDA in
striking a balance between conflicting rules.
A complete analysis would examine whether the federal rule
substantially would affect the result of litigation and thus lead to
forum shopping and discrimination. Considering the potentially
probative value of evidence of subsequent remedies makes Federal
Rule 407 appear outcome determinative. This evidence is relevant
in an action for negligence. 87 To establish negligence, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant did not conform to a reason-
able standard of care. "8 Evidence of subsequent repairs is arguably
282. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26 (discussing Erie, forum shopping, and
discrimination). As Professor Ely has noted, the RDA would eviscerate the rules because
they are replete with provisions whose implementation in lieu of state law would be outcome
determinative. Ely, supra note 5, at 721. This Note, however, contends that courts should
consider the policies behind the RDA, not its outcome determinative standard, in a conflict
of rules case.
283. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9.(1973).
284. 540 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1976).
285. Wellborn, supra note 5, at 417.
286. 727 F.2d at 932.
287. See Commentary, supra note 208, at 78.
288. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164, § 32, at 173 (W. KEETON,
D. DOBBS, R KEETON & D. OWEN 5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER & KEETON].
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probative of three of the elements that establish that cause of ac-
tion: the existence of a defect or risk, the foreseeability of that risk,
and the duty to take precautions against foreseeable injury.289
Even if the probative value of the evidence is not great, the Advi-
sory Committee note to Federal Rule 407 concedes that an infer-
ence of fault from the evidence is possible.290 Moreover, the evi-
dence is probably relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401.291
Considering the relevance of the evidence and the possible infer-
ence of fault, together with the likely impact on a jury, the evi-
dence could be a significant factor in the outcome of a case. As a
result, if a state court admits the evidence but a federal court does
not, the state forum would be far more attractive to plaintiffs. In
addition, unfairness would result if a nonresident sued a resident,
because the resident defendant could not remove the action to fed-
eral court. 92 Further inequities would result if a person suing a
citizen from a foreign state had to submit to a body of law differ-
ent from the law that applies if the same person sued a cocitizen in
a similar litigation. These evils-forum shopping and discrinina-
tion-are exactly what Erie, York, and Hanna sought to prevent
and yet are likely to occur because of the potential impact of Fed-
eral Rule 407 on substantive results.293
Although these issues are most appropriate in the context of
judge-made rules, the analysis is equally appropriate in a compre-
hensive consideration of all the relevant factors for a federal-state
conflict. The RDA analysis, therefore, considered along with the
REA analysis, further points the court toward choosing the state
Rule 407. When consideration of the second sentence of the REA
tips the scales toward finding that the federal rule affects substan-
tive state rights, the court should consider the concerns of forum
shopping and discrimination.
C. Modifying the Rule
Rather than doing away with a federal rule that conflicts with
a state rule and falls the above analysis, a court should consider
interpreting the federal rule narrowly to avoid the federal-state
289. Note, supra note 15, at 238; see PROSSER & KERrON, supra note 288, § 30, at 164
(discussing the elements of a negligence action).
290. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee note.
291. See supra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing and providing text of Rule
401).
292. 28 U.SC. § 1441 (1982).
293. See Ely, supra note 5, at 712 n.1.
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conflict altogether. Obviously, courts are not in the best position to
change a rule, but a court could carve out an exception to the rule,
or perhaps treat the rule in a limited fashion. For example, a court
could hold that Federal Rule 407 does not apply in diversity ac-
tions when there is a conflicting state rule. Following the examples
Congress set in Rule 501 and Rule 601,94 the court could reason
that Congress intended that in any action based on state substan-
tive grounds the state rule of evidence should apply. The Tenth
Circuit followed this approach in Moe, holding that a state rule
that conflicts with Rule 407 "must be applied in a diversity action
in order to effect uniformity and to prevent forum-shopping. 2 95
The District Court of Maine rejected this approach in French, rea-
soning that because Congress expressly provided for state conflicts
in some rules, it must have chosen deliberately to overlook Rule
407.96 This rationale, however, is unpersuasive because Congress
faced no actual state conflict with Rule 407 when Congress promul-
gated the rules, unlike Rule 501 and Rule 601, which were hotly
debated.
Both Dean McCormick and Judge Weinstein have suggested
treating Rule 407 as a limited privilege. 97 The privilege would be
unusually narrow in scope, excluding evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures only when a party offered the evidence to prove neg-
ligence.29 8 The trial judge would have to determine whether the ev-
idence fell within an exception to the general exclusionary rule.2 99
If a party did not assert the privilege, the trial judge would have to
decide whether the evidence was admissible under the general rele-
vancy standards of Rule 401, Rule 402, and Rule 403.300
These alternatives would preserve Federal Rule 407 and avoid
the spectre of holding "not only that Congress exceeded its consti-
tutional power in promulgating the Rule, but that [Congress] did
so upon the considered recommendation of the Advisory Commit-
294. See supra notes 174-75 and accompanying text.
295. Moe, 727 F.2d at 932.
296. See French, 101 F.R.D. at 371 n.3; see also supra text accompanying notes 244-50
(discussing French).
297. C. MCCORMICK ON EvinENCE § 275, at 817 (3d ed. 1984); 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 9, 407[01], at 12.
298. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 297, § 275, at 817; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 9, 1 407[01], at 12.
299. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 297, § 275, at 817; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M BERGER, supra
note 9, 1 407[01], at 12.
300. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 297, § 275, at 817; 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 9, 407[01], at 12.
624 [Vol. 38:585
THE CASE OF RULE 407
tee and of the Supreme Court."30 1 A better solution would be for
Congress or the Supreme Court to amend the Rule to make it con-
sistent with the exceptions in Rule 501 and Rule 601.02 If enough
courts heed the criticisms of the commentators and follow the lead
of the Tenth Circuit, Congress should become aware of this prob-
lem and solve it.
V. CONCLUSION
Maine Rule of Evidence 407 directly conflicts with Federal
Rule of Evidence 407. Congress was not aware of the conflict when
it enacted the Federal Rules because courts at that time univer-
sally recognized the exclusionary principle of Rule 407. The Maine
Advisory Committee, on the other hand, was aware of the conflict
when the committee chose to diverge from previous Maine law, the
generally prevailing law, and the Federal Rule. A classic federal-
state rules conflict, therefore, arose when the plaintiff in Rioux
brought a diversity suit in federal court. Despite a long tradition of
sensitivity to state substantive law, the Rioux decision ignored the
federalism implications of the conflict and applied the federal rule.
Congress, the Supreme Court, and certain circuit courts con-
sistently have responded deferentially to state substantive law.
From the moment Congress enacted the RDA until Congress inter-
vened in the Rules of Evidence, Congress has acted to protect state
law. In a line a cases from Erie to Hanna the Supreme Court also
has demonstrated sensitivity to state substantive law. In addition,
the Fifth and Tenth Circuits have emphasized the importance of
applying state substantive law in diversity cases. In light of this
tradition of deference, Congress seemingly would have protected
state law from Rule 407 if Congress had foreseen the conflict. The
Rioux court, therefore, should have made a more thorough analy-
sis, rather than simply applying a weak test to determine whether
Rule 407 was constitutional.
The Rioux court should have analyzed this conflict by refer-
ring to the REA standards and RDA policy considerations. The
court should have asked whether the rules are arguably substantive
in their underlying policies, the inherent nature of the law that the
rules regulate, or in terms of the constitutional scheme of federal-
ism. The court also should have considered whether Rule 407 vio-
301. Rioux, 582 F. Supp. at 625.




lates the aims of Erie to prevent forum shopping and the unfair-
ness that naturally results when conflicting rules demand
conflicting substantive results. Finally, rather than eliminating the
Federal Rule, the court could have carved out an exception that
would have applied conflicting state law in diversity actions, as the
Tenth Circuit has done.
Uniform federal rules are undoubtedly an important aspect of
the federal court system. At some point, however, uniformity must
give way to federalism. When a rule is as strongly substantive as
Rule 407, and its procedural grounds are as tenuous, a federal-
state conflict takes on serious overtones of federalism that courts
cannot ignore. Thus, in deciding future cases concerning conflicts
between a Federal Rule of Evidence and a state rule, courts should
use a threefold approach. First, the court should balance the rules
in light of both sentences of the REA. Second, the court should
consider the policies underlying the RDA. Last, the court should
determine whether any alternatives exist to eliminating the federal
rule altogether. This approach would provide a balanced and thor-
ough analysis of the conflict.
MARCIA LYN FINKELSTEIN
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